Who is betting on what in AI, and against whom.
Internet-scale text pretraining, then reinforcement learning on outcomes, then tools. Grounding, planning and memory are expected to emerge from scale.
Take a transformer, train it to predict the next token on most of the written internet, then teach it manners with human feedback and reasoning with reinforcement learning on problems that have checkable answers. Give it tools. Repeat with more compute.
That recipe produced every product a layperson has used: ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek, Kimi. The camp's claim is that the recipe keeps working. Grounding, planning and memory are expected to arrive as side effects of scale plus post-training, not as separate research programs.
The money reflects that confidence. Anthropic raised $65B at a $965B valuation in May 2026 and filed for an IPO on June 1; OpenAI filed a week later after a $122B round at $852B. Two Chinese labs, Zhipu and MiniMax, listed in Hong Kong in January. The open-weight labs in China keep the gap to the closed frontier under a year and have taken roughly half of third-party API traffic.
The fight inside the camp is about where the next gains come from: bigger pretraining runs, or more reinforcement learning after pretraining. Every other camp in this atlas is a bet on where this recipe runs out.
Unfamiliar terms are in the glossary.
Dominant on revenue, compute and talent. Two IPO filings in June 2026 will put audited numbers behind the valuations. Open-weight Chinese labs keep the gap to the closed frontier under a year and took a majority of third-party API traffic in 2026. Talent is consolidating: Karpathy and Jumper both joined Anthropic in spring 2026. The internal split that matters is pretraining-scale believers versus post-training-scale believers.
What would prove them right. Commercially proven already. The live question is whether it saturates on physical grounding, sample efficiency and post-deployment learning, which is exactly what every other camp bets on.
Researchers have held a research or faculty role; scientist-founders count. Founders, executives and investors are listed separately so nobody mistakes a boardroom for a lab. Where someone argues for a different camp than the one they work in, it says so.
Universities and institutes with people in this camp, from the roles recorded here. Not a ranking, and not complete: a place is listed when someone in the atlas works there.
Senior authors in this camp's core literature, found through the alphaXiv research index and listed on the strength of one paper each. Being on this list means they publish in the field, not that they have taken a side. The full list is on the People page.

NYSE:BABALargest open-weight family by downloads; passed Llama on Hugging Face in 2026.


NASDAQ:METAMeta Superintelligence Labs (TBD Lab under Wang) went all-in on frontier LLMs after LeCun left. Muse models are hosted, not open.
NASDAQ:MSFTSeven in-house MAI models at Build 2026; a superintelligence team separate from OpenAI.


NASDAQ:SPCXGrok. Compute-maximalist. Folded into SpaceX in 2026; publicly traded via SPCX.Also active here: Inception (Trained on the same text corpora and sold against camp 1 models); NVIDIA (GPUs for everyone; Nemotron open models.); Prime Intellect (Trains open models (INTELLECT series) on distributed compute.).
Loss falls predictably as you add parameters, data and compute, following a power law. Kaplan and colleagues measured it in 2020; it is the reason labs can budget a training run before running it.
Reinforcement learning from human feedback. Train a reward model on human preferences between answers, then optimize the language model against it. It turned GPT-3 into a usable assistant.
Skip the human raters where an answer can be checked mechanically (maths, code, unit tests) and reward the model directly. DeepSeek-R1 showed long chains of reasoning emerging from this alone.
Spend more compute at answer time, by thinking longer or sampling many candidates, instead of only at training time. The o-series made it a product knob.
Route each token through a few of many sub-networks so a trillion-parameter model costs a fraction of that to run. Now standard in every frontier and open-weight model.
Windows of a million tokens or more let a model read a codebase or a book in one pass, reducing the need for retrieval.
Let the model call code, browsers and APIs in a loop. Most of the 2026 product surface, and the reason the camp claims planning without a planner.
Whether to publish model weights. China's labs mostly do; the American frontier mostly does not.
The architecture everything since is built on.
The bet, stated as power laws: loss falls predictably with parameters, data and compute.
GPT-3. Scale produced in-context learning nobody trained for.
Chinchilla. Most models had been undertrained on data; the recipe changed overnight.
Sutton's essay that the scaling camp quotes more than he would like.
Reasoning trained with verifiable rewards on top of a pretrained base; the second scaling axis.
Research programs that live inside this camp without disagreeing with it about how intelligence works.
The second-largest research community after scaling, and almost entirely a program inside camp 1: it studies the models the scaling labs build. Mechanistic interpretability reverse-engineers circuits and features; alignment and control research asks how to keep a capable model doing what it was asked. A PhD applicant looking for this will not find it on the fault lines, because it does not disagree with camp 1 about how intelligence works, only about what to do with it.
Whoever measures the field shapes it. Benchmarks, arenas and forecasting shops decide which claims count, and their numbers are what the money watches. They sit across camps 1 and 5 because that is where the products are.
Tool use, memory, long-horizon planning and the harnesses that turn a model into a worker. Nearly all of it is engineering on top of camp 1 models rather than a new theory of intelligence, which is why the atlas does not list it as a camp. Camp 4 argues that real agency needs learning from the stream itself; this layer bets it can be scaffolded instead.
The picks and shovels of camp 1 apart from NVIDIA: chips built for serving rather than training, and the clouds that rent them. Their bet is that the models are settled enough to build silicon around, which is itself a position in the scaling debate.
| Lab | Access | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Google DeepMind | NASDAQ:GOOGL | Alphabet (GOOGL). Gemini plus every other camp. |
| Meta | NASDAQ:META | Meta (META). Frontier models, hosted since 2026. |
| Microsoft AI | NASDAQ:MSFT | Microsoft (MSFT). In-house MAI models plus the OpenAI stake. |
| xAI (SpaceX AI division) | NASDAQ:SPCX | SpaceX (SPCX) since June 2026; Grok is its AI division. |
| Z.ai (Zhipu) | HKEX:2513 | Z.ai (HKEX 2513), the first listed LLM company. |
| MiniMax | HKEX:2610 | MiniMax (HKEX 2610). |
| Alibaba (Qwen) | NYSE:BABA | Alibaba (BABA). Qwen is a cloud demand generator. |
| Baidu (ERNIE) | NASDAQ:BIDU | Baidu (BIDU). ERNIE. |
| NVIDIA | indirect | Nvidia (NVDA) sells the compute; the purest way to own the camp without picking a lab. |
| Anthropic | private | S-1 filed June 2026; listing expected late 2026. |
| OpenAI | private | S-1 filed June 2026; timing undecided. |
| DeepSeek | private | First outside round June 2026; IPO preparations reported. |
| Moonshot AI | private | Hong Kong IPO possible by end of 2026. |
Not investment advice. Private valuations are what the last round implied; "reported" means the press, not the company, gave the figure. Full table on the Capital page.